Measuring structural unemployment: Some neglected issues by Paqué, Karl-Heinz
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft





Kiel Working Papers, No. 505
Provided in cooperation with:
Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW)
Suggested citation: Paqué, Karl-Heinz (1992) : Measuring structural unemployment: Some
neglected issues, Kiel Working Papers, No. 505, http://hdl.handle.net/10419/47062Kieler Arbeitspapiere
Kiel Working Papers





Institutfiir Weltwirtschaft an der Universitat Kiel
The Kiel Institute of World Economics
ISSN 0342-0787The Kiel Institute of World Economics
D - 2300 Kiel, Dus ternbrooker Weg 120






The author himself, not the Kiel Institute of World Economics, is respons-
ible for the contents and distribution of each Kiel Working Paper. Since
the series involves manuscripts in a preliminary form, interested readers
are requested to direct criticism and suggestions to the author.- 1 -
Since the mid-1980s, discussions on structural unemployment among
macroeconomis ts have mostly taken place within a particular framework
which may be called the mismatch philosophy. Roughly speaking, it
interprets structural imbalance to mean a mismatch of labour demand and
labour supply between 'sectors' - be. they regions, industries or
occupations - and structural unemployment to denote that part of total
unemployment which can be explicitly ascribed to this mismatch. Two
families of mismatch measures have been developed and applied, one
focusing on the link between structural imbalance and the NAIRU (the
non-accelerating-inflation rate of unemployment), the other on the link
between structural imbalance and the location of the Beveridge-curve. By
and large, both families have generated the same empirical insight that
structural imbalances in Western European countries have not been a
major factor in the rise of non-cyclical unemployment in the last two
decades. By now, this claim has become something like an established
fact in the relevant literature,, though apparently not in the general
public.
This paper is no more than a critical note on the mismatch philosophy.
Its main point is that, under empirically acceptable assumptions, all
measures developed so far - and probably all measures likely to emerge
from refining the mismatch tools - are bound to seriously underestimate
the extent of structural unemployment by any reasonable standard. For
all that matters empirically, no period with a high share of mismatch in
total unemployment is ever likely to emerge. Hence, if structural means
mismatch, economists might as well stop worrying about structural labour
market issues altogether. Of course, this unpleasant consequence raises
the question whether the mismatch philosophy really captures the essence
of what structural imbalances ought to mean. To answer this question,
we shall set out an alternative framework which conforms more to what
the term 'structural unemployment' actually denotes in the policy debate.
The paper has a very simple structure. The first two sections present
and evaluate the two distinct though related mismatch families, i. e.
structural unemployment as a 'mismatch share' of the aggregate NAIRU
(Section I) and as a dislocation of the aggregate Beveridge-curve
(Section II). The discussion will cover both conceptual and empirical
issues; as far as data for empirical illustrations are used, they are taken- 2 -
from Germany, i. e. from that European country, which is probably the
richest source of different regimes of regional imbalances in the post-war
period with a very uneven distribution of unemployed Eastern refugees
in the early 1950's, a widening (?) North-South growth gap in the late
1970's and the 1980's, and an extreme - maybe even unique - East-West
prosperity and unemployment gap after economic unification in 1990. In
Section III, we shall sketch an alternative philosophy of structural
imbalances and unemployment.
I. Mismatch and the NAIRU -
The rationale of a link between mismatch and the NAIRU is based on a
very simple idea: if wages react more sensitively to changes in
unemployment at low than at high unemployment rates, then a sectoral
equalization of unemployment rates will reduce overall wage pressure at a
given average unemployment rate, or conversely, will reduce the average
non-inflationary unemployment rate at a given real wage level. The
intuition behind this idea is straightforward: if the stability gain of
'cooling down' the low-unemployment sector of the economy
over compensates the inflationary cost of 'heating up' the
high-unemployment sector, then an overall improvement of the
unemployment/inflation trade-off can be (hypothetically) realized by
removing the structural imbalance. The very percentage share, by which
the NAIRU can thus be reduced, may reasonably be called the share of
structural in total equilibrium unemployment.
So much for the basic rationale of the approach which can be translated
into a more rigorous operational framework within the realm of formal
NAIRU-theory. Let the multi-sectoral econom
production technology of the Cobb-Doug las -type
NAIRU-theory. Let the multi-sectoral economy be characterized by a
(1) y = $ n N.
Qi
1
with y being the single product ('output') of the economy, N. the level
of employment in sector i (i=l, 2,. . . , n), <J> (0«IK1) an efficiency parameter
See Layard, Nickell, Jackman [1991], pp. 308-311, and Jackman,
Layard, Savouri [1991].- 3 -
and a. (i=l, 2, . . . , n) the partial production elasticities of the sectoral
labour .inputs which add up to unity due to constant returns to scale
(-2 a. = 1). Assuming' normal-cost pricing, (1) implies a price equation of
the form . . ,
(2) p = (04))"
1 II w.°i
1
with 0 (O<0<1) being an index of product-market competitiveness and w.
(i=l, 2, . . . , n) the sectoral wage rates. In essence, (2) states that the
price level is a weighted geometric mean of the sectoral wage rates with
the weights being the partial production elasticities a. and the mean
being scaled up depending on the efficiency of production technology (<J>)
and the competitiveness of the product market (0). Dividing by p and
taking logs, we obtain
(3) log (0<J>) =2aL log (Wi/p)
which can be interpreted as a feasible real wage frontier giving the locus
of all sectoral real wage rates which are consistent with a constant price
level. To proceed any further, we now need, a set of sectoral real wage
functions. Let these be of the standard double logarithmic form
(A) log (v^/p) = p± - t log ui
with u. (i=l, 2, . . . , n) being the sectoral unemployment rates and 6.
(i=l, 2, . . . , n) and r constant parameters (6., T > 0). Note that this wage
equation implies equal unemployment elasticities of the real wage across
all sectors: each sector's real wage reacts to the respective sector
unemployment rate, but it does so with the same degree of wage
flexibility or rigidity. Given (3) and (4), we can now derive an
unemployment frontier
(5) log (0$) = 2 ajLPi -Tlo, log u±
which denotes the locus of all combinations of sectoral unemployment
rates that are consistent with aggregate equilibrium, i. e. with the
absence of inflationary pressures. Under some rather innocent simplifying_ 4 -
assumptions, this locus can be drawn for the two-sector case as a
convex curve in u_, u^-space, with the convexity being the consequence
of the convenient form of a double-logarithmic wage function. The
convexity implies that the minimum average unemployment rate consistent
with equilibrium is always at the point of equality between the
inter sectoral unemployment rates.
By some simple algebraic manipulations of (5) - adding the term
(Y log u) on both sides, dividing by t and rearranging - we obtain
(6) log u = 1/r [2 aiPi - log (04>)] -2 a, log (vu/u) :•= N + S,
i.e. the log of average unemployment is split into two additive terms,
namely a constant (N) which is independent of mismatch and thus
represents the non-structural component (N = 1/r [2a./3. - log (9$)]),
and the term S (with S = - 2 a. log (u./u)), the structural component,
which varies with the degree of mismatch, i. e. the deviation of log u.
from log u. Note that N is positive by assumption about its constituent
parameters (without loss of generality) and that S is positive due to the
convexity of the wage and the unemployment frontiers.
Empirically, S is the core of the matter: if we can obtain an estimate of
the a. and thus of S, we can decompose any aggregate unemployment
rate into a structural and a non-structural part. The most
straightforward and perfectly reasonable approach is to assume that the
a. which. are by definition partial' production elasticities and the wage
shares of sectoral labour, equal the respective sectoral shares in the
total labour force (L). With a. = L./L and u = 2 (L./L) u., S can be
written as
(7) S = - [2 (L±/L) log u± - log 2 (I^/L) uj
or, in non-logarithmic form,
(8) e
S = n (u.
Li
/L) / [2 (L /L) u ]
i i
For a diagramatic exposition, see Layard, Nickell, Jackman [1991],
p. 309.- 5 -
which is nothing but the ratio of the geometric mean of the sectoral
unemployment rates - weighted by the labour shares - divided by the
respective arithmetic mean. If one interprets the term N in (6) as the
log of the minimum average unemployment rate which could be reached in
the absence of structural imbalance (i.e. u. = u for all u. so that
S = 0), then the share of mismatch in total unemployment (MS~) is given
by
(9) MSQ - 1 - l/e
S
with e defined as in (8).
So much for the framework of analysis. Table 1 gives a rough
quantitative impression of the magnitude of MS- for the case of regional
imbalances in Germany. The main message of the numbers in the table is
certainly that they are not very high at any time: in the early 1950s -
a period of a widely appreciated regional gap with the rural Northern
states of West Germany flooded by refugees with unemployment rates
above 20 per cent compared to less than 5 per cent in the South -, the
measure MS- stays as low as about 15 per cent. Since the early 1970s, it
has remained even well below 10 per cent: although it rose significantly
from the late 1970s to the late 1980s, the rise took place in a negligible
range from 2. 6 per cent in 1975-79 to 5.8 per cent in 1985-89. If one
takes these numbers at face value, all the fuzz about rising regional
imbalances in the last decade was grossly overdone. However, the most
striking fact is the quantitative picture which MS- gives of German
unification. Even if the vast number of short-term employees in East
Germany (the former German Democratic Republic) are fully counted as
unemployed, no more than 20 per cent of total unemployment in Germany
can be characterized as 'regional' - despite an Eastern 'unemployment
rate' of 26.9 per cent as compared to 6.5 per cent in the West and
despite more than half (50.3 per cent) of all unemployed persons being
located in the East. Any 'naive' observer would speak of. a dramatic - if
not even a historically unique - predominance of a regionally
concentrated crisis, but the measure MS- remains remarkably
unimpressed.- 6 -
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Notes: in p. c of total; annual observations at the end of September;
for five-year periods arithmetic average of annual
observations
**
nine states, excluding the Saar and Berlin
***
number of unemployed persons measured excluding short-time
employed persons
number of unemployed persons measured including short-time
employed persons- 7 -
To obtain a more complete picture of the sensitivity of MS- to variations
in sectoral unemployment rates, let us focus on a world with two sectors
(1,2) which is described by just two parameters, namely the relative
weight of the sectors determined by the index u for sector 1 (0<JJL<1) and
(1-u) for sector 2, and the relative performance of the sectors
determined by an index X with u- = (1-X)u« for O<X<1, i.e. without loss
of generality, we take sector 1 to have the 'good' and sector 2 the 'bad'
labour market.
Under these assumptions, MS,, is given by
(10) MSQ = 1 - (I-X^/CL-JJX).
Table 2 presents a matrix of parameter constellations of a and X. Picking
for interpretation the simplest case of two equally sized sectors (JJL=O. 5),
we find the intuition of our naive observer fully vindicated: at a X of
0.5 - meaning the unemployment, rate in sector 2 being twice as high as
in sector 1 - the share of structural in total unemployment is less than
6 per cent. If X is 0.8 - meaning, e.g., an unemployment rate of
2 per cent in sector 1 and 10 per cent in sector 2 - no more than
25 per cent of all unemployed persons can be categorised as structural,
although 83.3 per cent of all jobless find themselves in the 'bad' one of
the two equally sized sectors. Only at very extreme states of inequality
(X>0.9), which are way off any practical relevance, does the structural
component in unemployment become a serious rival to the non-structural
one. This general pattern is fully supported for other values of u with
the MSn at u=0. 5 being rather close to its maximum overall JJL All this is
not surprising given the anatomy of the index as depending on a ratio of
a geometric and an arithmetic mean (equation 8): although these types of
means tend to differ, the difference is usually quite small and so will be
the share of structural mismatch.
Note that our conclusions as to the order of magnitude of mismatch
unemployment are fairly robust with respect to the choice of a production
-1 -1
It can be shown that MS- has a maximum at JJL = X + [log (1-X)]
which is between 0.50 and 0.68 in the empirically relevant range
0. 1 < X < 0.9.- 8 -
Table 2: The Share of Structural Unemployment MSn for Selected
Parameter Configurations of X and JJL (Equation 10)
l± 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0 0 0 0 0
0.1 0.0 0. 1 0. 1 0.1
0.2 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.6
0.3 0.5 0.9 1.3 1.5
0.4 1.0 1.9 2.5 3.0
0.5 1.8 3.3 4.4 5.3
0.6 2.9 5.4 7.4 8.8
0.7 4.7 8.6 11.8 14.2
0.8 7.5 13.7 18.8 22.7
0.9 12. 7 23. 1 31. 3 37. 8
0.95 18.1 32.2 43.1 51.3 57.4 61.5 63.3 62.1 53.5
0.99 30.0 50.4 64.3 73.8 80.2 84.5 87.0 87.9 85.5




















































Figures for MS- in per cent.- 9 -
technology. If the sectoral production functions (equation 1) are of the
CES- rather than the Cobb-Doug las-type, the index tends to be lower
(higher) if the elasticity of substitution (a) between sectoral labour
inputs is higher (lower) than the Cobb-Doug las-benchmark level of one.
This result has intuitive plausibility: the more substitutable sectoral
labour is, the less a dispersion of unemployment rates can be viewed as
reflecting a genuine mismatch and a cause of wage pressure. However, in
the empirically relevant range, the difference between the respective
2
Gobb-Douglas- and the CES-index remains very small. For most relevant
sectoral units, the empirical evidence points to a a greater than one so
that the Cobb-Doug las-model should mark something like an upper limit
for mismatch. For regions in particular, it would be quite unrealistic to
assume a a of much lower than one since the labour force is likely to be
quite similar in characteristics between regions. If anything, a a of
greater than one might be expected.
Note also that the choice of an alternative empirically relevant
specification of the wage function does not alter the quality of our
conclusions either. As can be seen from equations (6)-(8), the structural
component of unemployment does not depend on the parameters B. and r
of the wage function (4) so that any decomposition of unemployment
which is based on a calculation of the structural component, is also
invariant to the parametric characteristics of wage behaviour as long as
the double logarithmic form of the wage equation and the Cobb-Douglas
form of the production function are retained. If the double logarithmic
wage function is replaced by a semi-logarithmic one - empirically a quite
common alternative at least for selected ranges of unemployment rates -
See, with a slightly different intention, Layard, Nickell, Jackman,
1991, p. 311 and Annex 6. 1, pp. 550-551. They prove the following
point for a linerarized version of the above model.
2 • ' • • •
In the linearized model version, this is so because the ratio of the
indices just equals [1 - r(a-l)] with r being the elasticity of the
sectoral real wage with respect to the unemployment rate, which should
be no greater than, say, 0. 1 in actual practice so that the ratio will
be quite close to 1.
Again, the result has intuitive appeal: in a Cobb-Douglas world, factor
shares are independent of factor prices so that the 'weighting' of the
different sectors will be invariant to changes in the sectoral real wage
structure brought about via the wage function by a sectoral
differentiation of unemployment rates.- 10 -
the unemployment frontier (equation 5) becomes
(11) log (0<J>) - 2 aipi - t 2 a^,
and the decomposition (equation 6) now reads as
(12) u = 1/Y [XaiPi - log (0<J>)] - [2a.u. - u] ':- N + S.
For a. = L./L, the term S vanishes since u = 2 (L./L)u. ; mismatch
unemployment is then zero. More general formulations may allow for a
curvature of the wage function anywhere 'between' the semi-log and the
double-log case, but the fact remains that only relative or
log-differences of sectoral unemployment rates matter for mismatch; hence
the standard double logarithmic specification sets something like an upper
limit for the share of structural unemployment at a given intersectoral
dispersion of unemployment rates.
From all this, it can quite safely be concluded that the low shares of
structural unemployment as given in Tables 1 and 2 are not statistical
curiosities brought about by whatever awkward parameter constellation.
Rather they must be taken as benchmarks - if anything: upper
benchmarks - which are the direct consequence of the core assumptions
underlying NAIRU-theorising, namely a well-behaved production function
of the Cobb-Douglas- or the CES-type and a double- or semi-logarithmic
wage equation. If these seemingly innocent assumptions produce such low
levels of mismatch in the empirically relevant ranges, then it is perfectly
justified to conclude that - for all that matters in practice - structural
unemployment is bound to play no significant role in the
NAIRU-framework. Of course, this result by itself is most interesting
and valuable: it means that a set of standard convexity assumptions is
powerful enough to reduce the sectoral dispersion of labour market
disequilibria to a virtually irrelevant matter in the sense that this
dispersion has very little bearing on aggregate wage pressure.
Oddly enough, the most fervent proponents of mismatch philosophy do
not draw any such conclusion. As far as they pay attention to the
For a proof of this proposition in a linearized version of the model, see
Layard, Nickell, Jackman, p. 311 and p. 334 (footnote 12).- 11 -
absolute magnitude of the index at all, they point out that one should
not just look at one index defined over one structural characteristic like,
say, regions, but rather at a whole set of indices with respect to
different structural dimensions (e.g., regions, occupations, industries
etc.); if the underlying multi-dimensional imbalances are close to
orthogonal, the share of structural unemployment may well add up to a
reasonably high number.- This pragmatic argument does not touch upon,
let alone remove, the core of our point, and it is important to
understand why. Our point is based on a comparison of the mismatch
approach with a naive or intuitive standard of structural unemployment.
E.g., when Table 1. tells us that, in a world of equally sized sectors,
less than 6 per cent of all unemployed persons are categorized as
structural if one sector has double the unemployment rate of the other,
we conclude that there must be a fundamental discrepancy between the
philosophy underlying the NAIRU-mismatch approach and the philosophy
underlying our heuristics which - although still unspecified - clearly
speaks for much higher shares of structural unemployment. This
discrepancy permeates virtually all numbers in the Table; it is driven to
an obvious extreme in the case of a semi-log-linear wage function which
implies zero mismatch all throughout, whatever the intersectoral
dispersion of unemployment rates. It cannot be defined away by a
reference to a multi-dimensional case in which the reference standard is
blurred by the complexity of the issue; more generally, a reference to
'other causes' does not provide an acceptable refuge from the
consequences of a ceteris-paribus argument if the different causes can
logically and empirically be separated, which is no doubt the case for the
various structural dimensions of mismatch.
In a similar vein, it might be argued that one should not take too
seriously the level of the index, but rather focus exclusively on its
development over time which tells the story of whether structural
unemployment has increased, decreased or remained constant in relative
importance. Although this case for turning a blind eye is often not made
explicitly, it seems to underlie the general methodology of economists
using mismatch indices in macroeconomic models or in unemployment
accounting which is to ascribe changes in unemployment to changes in
See Layard, Nickell, Jackman [1991], p. 310, who estimate for Britain
in a linearized version of the model a mismatch share of unemployment
over six different dimensions of roughly 1/3.- 12 -
various exogenous 'causes'. Such a procedure and its underlying premise
are unsatisfactory: after all, mismatch indices such as S in equations (6)
and (7) - and also the ones to follow in section II of this paper - have
unambiguous implications for the share of structural unemployment within
the logic of their own framework, and one cannot simply escape this fact
by a subsequent correlation analysis without becoming severely
inconsistent. E.g., what should be thought of a study which shows that,
for two equally-sized sectors, a rise of X from 0.5 to 0.6 implies a
much larger rise of the share of structural unemployment than the one
indicated in Table 2 (namely from 5.7 to 9.6 per cent)? Obviously, a
subsequent unemployment accounting based on a correlation analysis does
not have the same force as the implications and restrictions which the
mismatch approach invariably involves.
The conclusion to draw from all this is plain: if one seriously wants to
clarify the issue, one has to specify, juxtapose and evaluate the two
different philosophies underlying the candidates for measuring structural
unemployment. Before doing precisely that, let us briefly sketch the
second family of mismatch indices which is based on the Beveridge- or
U/V-curve.
II. Mismatch and the Beveridge-Curve
The modern literature on the Beveridge-curve identifies structural
unemployment as the result of a mismatch between job vacancies and
unemployed persons. Structural unemployment is taken to exist "if, given
the configuration of vacancies, it would be possible to reduce
unemployment, or more precisely, to increase the rate of job hiring by
2
moving an umemployed worker from one sector to another" with the
sector being an occupation, industry, region or any other structural
category, and the rate of job separations assumed to be exogenously
determined. Conversely, structural balance or zero structural
unemployment is postulated to prevail whenever it is impossible to
increase the rate of job hirings and thus to reduce unemployment
through intersectoral movements of unemployed persons.
1 Parts of this section are based on Paque [1989], pp. 2-11.
2 Jackman, Roper [1987], p. 11.lUI VVCIIVVH l
- 13 -
In more technical terms, the state of structural balance can be described
as that configuration of the existing stock of unemployment across
sectors which, given the sectoral pattern of vacancies, maximizes
aggregate hires. Hence, to obtain a set of operational first-order
conditions for structural balance, one has to postulate a hiring function
H( ). If, for any sector i, this function is assumed to have the common
form
(13) Hi = H1 (IT, V±) with 6Hi/aUi> 8Hi/6Vi > 0
where U. and V. are the numbers of unemployed persons and vacancies
in sector i and H( ) is a convex, linear-homogeneous function, then it
can easily be shown that maximization of aggregate hires H = 2 H.
subject to 2 U. = U = constant (taking V. as given) requires the ratio of
unemployed persons to vacancies to be equal across all sectors and thus
equal to the respective overall ratio. This implies that
(14) U^/U = Vi/V for i = 1,2,....n,
with U (and V respectively) being the aggregate number of unemployed
workers (and vacancies respectively). Following the logic of equation
(14), a measure of mismatch (M) can be defined as
(15) M := 1/2 2 |U±/U - y±/v|.
i
M can be interpreted as the share of the unemployed persons (or
vacancies) which would have to be moved across sectors to achieve
structural balance at a given configuration of vacancies (or unemployed
persons). Multiplying M by U (or V) yields the respective absolute
number of unemployed persons (or vacancies).
For years, M has been the most frequently used index of structural
2
mismatch in the modern literature. As has been recognized, it does not
See Jackman, Roper [1987], pp. 11-12.
2
See i. a. Jackman, Layard, Pissarides [1984], Johnson, Layard [1985],
Layard, Nickell, Jackman [1985], Layard [1986], Pissarides [1986],
Jackman, Roper [ 1987] for the United Kingdom, and Franz, Konig
[1986], Burda, Sachs [1987], Franz [1989] and Franz [1991] for West
Germany.- 14 -
measure the extent of structural unemployment in the sense that, if
structural balance were established, unemployment would fall by the
share M; rather, it measures the share of unemployed persons which
would have to be moved to achieve a maximum of hiring s, with yet no
quantifiable implications on how much employment could be thus gained.
However, it is the potential employment gain which gives us an idea of
the dimension of a structural unemployment problem, and not the sheer
number or share of people to be moved. Fortunately, the hiring function
can serve as the basis for an operational measure of structural
unemployment: one may ask by how much total unemployment could be
reduced if structural balance were achieved at a given level of aggregate
hirings.
To answer this question, one has to specify the parametric shape of the
hiring function. In the literature the most widely used sectoral hiring
function is of the linear-homogenous Cobb-Douglas-type
(16) Hi = T^iVi^"
0
 wit
h 0 < a < 1 and T. > 0 for i = l,2,...,n.
In sectoral steady state, entries to unemployment E. and exits from
unemployment H. are equal in each sector. Assuming the entries to be
proportional to employment N., i.e. E. = e.N., with e. being a constant
entry rate for any sector, substituting e.N. for H. in (16) and
rearranging yields




Taking a weighted average of all equations i (i=l,2,. .,n) with the
weights being the shares in total employment, we obtain




which after some further algebraic manipulations becomes




1""] := N'-S'.- 15 -
Basically, equation (19) says that aggregate hirings are a multiplicative
function of a structural component S', which depends on the sectoral
distribution of unemployed persons and vacancies, and a non-structural
component N\ which depends only on the aggregate vacancy and
unemployment 'rates'. It can easily be shown that S' varies between
0 and 1 and reaches its maximum for an equal ratio of unemployed
2 persons to vacancies in -all sectors. Roughly speaking, the term N'
describes a convex Beveridge-curve, i.e. the locus of all points with
constant aggregate hirings in (V/N, U/N)-space at a given degree of
search efficiency Y. in all sectors; in turn, S' denotes the loss in terms
of hirings that is incurred due to the sectoral mismatch of vacancies and
unemployment. In graphical terms, S' stands for a rightward
displacement of the Beveridge-curve which is exclusively due to the
sectoral imbalance.
Equation (19) contains the germ for two different - though closely
related - measures of structural unemployment. The common feature of
these two measures is that they take mismatch unemployment to be the
aggregate unemployment which could be spared at a given level of
hirings if there were no structural imbalance, i.e. if S' in equation (19)
were equal to 1. The two measures differ in what they keep constant in
this hypothetical excercise.
Rewriting (19) as
(20) HQ = S' • v° u
1-"
with H- being a constant weighted average level of hirings, v the
aggregate 'vacancy rate' (:= V/N) and u the aggregate 'unemployment
rate' (:= U/N), we can now define a hypothetical state of structural
balance (S' = 1) with the same level of hirings HL., but possibly different
aggregate vacancy and unemployment rates (v*, u*), i.e.
Strictly speaking, U/N is not an unemployment rate, but the ratio of
the number of unemployed persons and the number of employed ones.
2
See i. a. Layard, Nickell, Jackman [1991], p. 335, footnote 19.
Other causes of rightward shifts may be found in changes of the
'average' search efficiency r which is held constant here.- 16 -




Together, (20) and (21) imply that




Depending on the restrictions we impose on the right-hand side of this
equation, we can now derive two different measures of mismatch
unemployment. If we assume that v/u = v*/u*, i. e. if we compare the
hypothetical shift of the Beveridge-curve caused by structural balancing
along ,a straight line through the origin in u/v-space, then (22) becomes
1/S' = u/u* and the share of mismatch in total unemployment





If we instead assume that v = v*. i. e. if we compare the hypothetical
shift of he Beveridge-curve at a given level of v, i. e. parallel to the
u-axis in u/v-space, equation (22) becomes 1/S' = (u/u*)
 a and the
share of mismatch in total unemployment (MS~) is given by
(24) MS2 - 1 - (S')
1/(1"
a






Note that 0 < MS-, MS» <> 1 and that MS1 5 MS- since 0 i S' i 1 and
0 < a < 1. This makes intuitive sense: given a convex u/v-curve, moving
along a straight line through the origin is 'the shorter way' than moving
parallel to the u-axis so that less is ascribed to mismatch in the MS--
than in the MS--framework. Economically, MS., appears to be the
preferable measure: if the ratio (u/v) is taken as a rough index of the
state of the business cycle at whatever degree of structural imbalance
- a most plausible interpretation - then it is MS., which can be
considered as something like a 'cyclically adjusted' mismatch share of
unemployment.
The measure MS1 is developed in Jackman, Roper [1987], pp. 13-14,
the measure MS» in Layard, Nickell, Jackman [1991), p. 326. To our
knowledge, the 'two measures have not yet been explicitly juxtaposed
and compared with respect to their exact economic meaning.- 17 -
To give the two measures empirical content, we have to make an
assumption about the magnitude of the partial hiring elasticities a and
(1-a). Following the bulk of. the econometric evidence on
Beveridge-curves, we take a to be 0.5. Note in, advance, however, that
the qualitiy of our conclusions does not depend strongly on the exact
value of a, at least as long as it remains in the empirically relevant
range, say, 1/3 £ a 5 2/3.
Table 1 presents calculations of MS., and MS- for Germany in selected
periods and for selected regional disaggregations. As in the case of MSn,
the main message of the numbers is that they are not very high at any
time, with MS.- being even lower than MSQ and MS_ falling more or less
in the order of magnitude of MS». Hence, basically, our conclusions on
the low share of mismatch in total unemployment holds not only for MSQ
but also for MS? and a fortiori for MS...
To obtain a more systematic picture of the sensitivity of the mismatch
measure to sectoral variations, let us again focus on a world with just
two sectors (1, 2) which is described by two parameters, namely the
shares of sector 1 in total vacancies (d) and in total unemployment (e),
with 0 £ d, e £ 1; consequently, sector 2's respective shares are given
by 1-6 and 1-e. For a = 0.5, the two measures of the share of mismatch
unemployment thus boil down to









respectively. Table 3 depicts the values of MS- and MS~ for different
parameter configurations of <J and e. Note that the equality of the partial
hiring elasticities of vacancies and unemployment makes the two
parameters interchangeable so that we can confine each measure to just
one half of the table's matrix, with the diagonal of structural balance for
d = e being common to both. The striking fact is that, for a wide range
of d (0. 2 < d < 0.8) and e (0.2 < e < 0.8), MS. stays below 20 per cent
See, e.g., Hannah [1983], Jackman, Layard, Pissarides [1986],
Jackman, Roper [1987], Blanchard, Diamond [1989].- 18 -
Table 3: The Share of Structural Unemployment MS., and MS« for






















































































































































Figures for MS- and MS_ in per cent.- 19 -
and MS_ below 36 per cent. Only for extremely unequal distributions of
unemployment and vacancies, with 6 being close to zero (or one) and €
being close to one (or zero) can the share of structural in total
unemployment measured by MS., and MS? compete in magnitude with the
non-structural share.
What does all this mean in the more familiar language of unemployment
and vacancy rates, now defined as the number of unemployed (vacancies)
divided by the labour force? If one assumes the two sectors to have an
equally-sized labour force with an average unemployment and vacancy
rate of, say, 5 per cent, then the restrictions 6 = 0.2 and e = 0. 8 imply
that, in sector 1, the unemployment rate is 2 per cent and the vacancy
rate 8 per cent, in sector 2 vice versa. Any 'naive' observer would
obviously interpret this as a situation of severe structural imbalance,
with something like three quarters of both the numbers of vacancies and
unemployed to be regarded as structural. However, the measures MS.,
and MS_ do not bear out anything like that, as they classify no more
than 20 (36) per cent of the unemployed as structural. Other numbers
from the table could be easily chosen so as to support the general
impression that MS2 and a fortiori MS., are very conservative indices of
structural unemployment in the empirically relevant range. All this
parallels our judgement on MS—
Of course, one might again discuss various lines of reasoning which
could be brought up in defence of the measures MS., and MS~ or, more
generally, of measures based on shifts of the Beveridge-curve. In
particular, one might offer alternative parametric shapes of the
Cobb-Doiiglas hiring technology. However, in view of the empirical
evidence which broadly supports a hiring function of the type (16) with
a =1/2, any such attempt would remain an ad-hoc adjustment to avoid
unpleasant implications of an otherwise most plausible model specification.
To be sure, marginal variations within the present framework do not
really touch upon the main conclusions: as long as the basic convexity
assumptions as to the hiring technology are retained, there is no real
escape from the fact that structural unemployment is empirically
irrelevant. We shall therefore move straight on to the core of the matter
which is more of a conceptual than of a technical nature and which is
common to the two families of measures discussed so far.- 20 -
III. Alternative Philosophies of Structural Unemployment
To repeat, the two families of mismatch measures have basically the same
implication, namely that structural unemployment as a share of total
(equilibrium) unemployment is of a very small magnitude, in actual
practice probably too small to matter for economic policy making. Or, to
put it differently: whatever the reasons for a high aggregate rate of
unemployment in steady-state-equilibrium may be, they are unlikely to
have a pronounced intersectoral dimension which should be taken as a
target for corrective policy measures. E.g., even if unemployment rates
look very different across regions, the mismatch evidence on regional
unemployment ought to make one conclude that policy should focus on the
aggregate, not on selected regional units, i.e. policy should tackle
causes of equilibrium unemployment common to the economy as a whole,
not to specific regions. This is a strong policy conclusion which can
hardly be avoided if one takes the mismatch measures seriously.
Of course, it is no analytical coincidence that both families of mismatch
measures have the same type of policy implications as their underlying
philosophies and the technical consequences therefrom are very similar.
In particular, both approaches take structural imbalance to mean a sort
of 'distortion' within an economy which does at least some harm to the
aggregate performance and which can be cured - at least hypothetically -
by an appropriate rearrangement between sectors of the economy to
achieve a state of 'optimal' aggregate performance defined as structural
balance; if at all, the quantitative relevance of the structural imbalance
can be measured by the extent of its doing harm to the performance of
the whole. It is clear that the indices MS MS., and MS« are
brain-children of this philosophy as they are based on the premise that a
structural imbalance is nothing but a mismatch, i.e. a 'distortion', in the
allocation of unemployed persons over the sectors of the economy which
either leads to a greater than minimal aggregate real wage pressure and
thus a higher than minimal NAIRU or to a less than maximum aggregate
level of hirings at given vacancies or at a given ratio of unemployed
persons to vacancies. In both cases, the result is unambiguous: the
distortion does very little harm to the aggregate performance.
Technically, the reason for this result lies in the vice or virtue of
convexity: without appropriate convexity assumptions at crucial points of- 21 -
the models T be it on the production function, the wage equation or the
hirings function - structural unemployment does not exist; however, with
convexity assumptions which are theoretically sound and empirically well
confirmed, structural unemployment does exist, but only as a marginal
issue. To put it differently: convexity assumptions are needed to distill
sectoral performances into a single measure of aggregate performance,
which is the core of the underlying philosophy; but in assuming
convexity, it becomes evident that mismatch is an empirically almost
irrelevant matter.
Does the 'mismatch philosophy' really capture the essence - not the
manifold ambiguities - of what is meant by a structural imbalance in the
policy debate? In our view, it does clearly not. A 'naive' economist is
likely to follow the logic of a completely different philosophy which might
be called the 'comparative sectoral approach'. Roughly speaking, it
amounts to simply juxtaposing the labour market performance of different
sectors: some best-performing sector is taken as the relevant standard
for all others, and the negative deviation of the others from this
standard is taken as the informational basis for measuring the extent of
the 'structural imbalance'. Note that the performance of the economy as a
whole is per se irrelevant; only the inter sectoral difference in
performance counts, independent of whether it hampers the aggregate
performance or not.
An extreme example of a regional imbalance - the present East-West
unemployment gap in unified Germany - nicely illustrates the point; When
the 'naive' economist speaks of a high structural unemployment in the
East (broadly defined, i.e. including short-time workers), he probably
means that part of Eastern unemployment which can be ascribed to the
specifically regional crisis due to the transformation of the East from a
command system into a market economy. In this sense, the unemployment
rate of 5-6 per cent prevailing in the West, is the reference standard for
comparison; similarly for the long-standing north/south-gap in West
Germany, when the industrial crises in branches like iron and steel and
shipbuilding in the 1970s and early 1980s had a particularly pronounced
regional component; similarly also for the early 1950s when the labour- 22 -
supply in the rural North was drastically expanded by a flood of ethnic
German refugees from Eastern Europe.
In its simplest form, the approach comes down to calculating the
equilibrium unemployment rates of the relevant sectors, taking the lowest
one as a benchmark for a 'non-structural' jobless rate and then
classifying the unemployment in all sectors which goes beyond this rate
as structural. Formally, this means that structural unemployment (SU) in
each sector is given by
(27) SIT = U± - um.nL. for i = 1,2,....n
with L. being the labour force in sector i and u . the unemployment rate
in the best-performing sector n. Summing over the SU. yields
(28) X SU. = 2 U. - u . 2 L..
l l min l
Dividing (28) by total unemployment U, we obtain the share of structural
unemployment SP (P for 'performance') as
(29) SP = 1 - u . /u. min
In our view, it is this comparative sectoral approach and not the
mismatch philosophy which really addresses the main structural question
of the economic policy debate, namely the question whether an economy
is integrating or disintegrating in terms of the performances of its
different sectors, be they regions, industries, occupations etc. For
example, when a German economist speaks of the above mentioned
regional imbalance of unemployment between the West and the East, he is
very unlikely to have in mind the policy questions of how much overall
wage pressure could be reduced or by how much aggregate hirings could
be increased through a hypothetical reshuffling of labour between the
relevant regions; . he rather compares the performance of both regions in
supplying 'their' labour with jobs, thereby implicitly taking the best
performing region as a kind of reference standard for the whole of the
country.-23 -
Of course, it might look tempting to criticise this approach for being
'atheoretical' as it does not provide a theory of linking the sectoral with
the aggregate performance. As far as it goes, this critique is justified:
there is in fact no such link in the comparative sectoral approach, but
that is precisely its advantage over the mismatch philosophy since it
reduces structural, imbalance to what it is in the policy debate, namely a
purely comparative attribute to denote differential equilibrium
performances of sectors. In a more fundamental sense, the approach is
not atheoretical at all: any theory which helps to explain why the
sectoral performances differ will be important for diagnosis and for
deriving adequate 'structural' policy conclusions, i.e. policy recipes
which aim at improving the performance of the 'bad' sectors and thus to
equalize the equilibrium unemployment rates at the lowest feasible level.
The comparative sectoral approach merely implies that there is nothing
more to consider than just the very theories of sectoral equilibrium
unemployment rates, in particular no theory of a link between sectoral
and aggregate performances. .
In this context, it is most interesting to note that a close relative of the
NAIRU-mismatch model of section I leads to a measure of structural
unemployment which is formally identical with (29). To show this, let us
assume that the real wage in any sector i is determined not by the
unemployment rate in that very sector, but rather by the unemployment
rate in some 'leading' sector of the economy which happens to be the one
with the tightest labour market, i. e. with the lowest unemployment rate.
Formally, this means that the wage function for sector i is given by
(30) log (w /p) = B. - r log u
X X Li
with u. being the unemployment rate in the leading sector and all other
parameters and variables defined as in section I. The corresponding
unemployment frontier reads as
(31) log (0<D) = 2 a.p. - 7 log u ,
IX Li
For the following formal analysis of this case, see Layard, Nickell,
Jackman [1991], p. 312.- 24 -
the decomposition of log unemployment in a non-structural and a
structural component as
(32) log u = 1/7 [Sap - log (0$)] - 2a.log (u./u),
XI J. Li
and thus the share of mismatch in total unemployment as
(33) MS3 = 1 - uL/u,
which is formally identical with (29). The economic logic of this result
is straightforward: if unemployment in sector i does not enter the wage
function in sector i, aggregate wage pressure will not depend on
a weighted average of all sectors' unemployment rates; it will rather
depend exclusively on the jobless rate of the leading sector which has




NAIRU^-context is defined as that share of total unemployment, which can
be spared without changing aggregate wage pressure, this share will
naturally be determined by the (log-) difference between the leading
sector's and the average unemployment rate.
Although (29) and (33) are formally identical, they are based on totally
different approaches to the matter: (29) is the direct outcome of a
theoretical concept which takes a structural imbalance to mean a
difference in sectoral performance and which, as a reasonable
approximation, measures 'sectoral performance' by the respective sectoral
unemployment rates. It is independent of the particular parametric
constellation of production, wage and hiring functions. In contrast, (33)
is to apply only for the special case that a sector has no 'autonomous'
wage function, but is rather externally dominated by the state of the
labour market in a leading sector. Whether and to what extent this
happens to be the case is a purely empirical matter with very dramatic
quantitative consequences. This can be seen for the case of Germany in
Within the NAIRU-framework, one may even derive 'mixed' cases with
the real wage in sector i determined both by unemployment in sector i
and in the leading sector. See Layard, Nickell, Jackman [1991],
p. 334, footnote 13. For our argument in the text, this case has no
particular relevance.- 25 -
Table 1 which presents the measures SP=MS^ for the relevant regional
units and periods. It is obvious that SP turns out to be vastly higher
than any of the mismatch measures compiled in the Table so far, and
that SP reaches dimensions which are plausible in view of what has been
said in the preceding sections of the paper. If we again enter a world of
two sectors (1,2) which can be described by two parameters u and X that
determine the relative weight (u) and the relative performance (X) of the
sectors as in section I, SP=MS_ is given by
(34) SP = MS3 = (1-JJL)/(1/X-U).
Table 4 presents this share of structural unemployment for selected
parameter configurations of JJL and X. From the Table, it is immediately
clear that SP implies much higher shares of structural unemployment than
MS», MS1, and MS_, and again that the orders of magnitude of SP are
more plausible than the ones we obtained from the prior measures. E.g.,
for equally sized sectors (JJ=O. 5), a large intersectoral spread of the
unemployment rates between, say, 2 per cent in sector 1 and 8 per cent
in sector 2 (X=0.8) now finds its due reflection in a share of structural
unemployment of almost 2/3 which fully confirms the intuitive economic
policy judgement. Other measures could be easily picked to support this
conclusion.
The picture conveyed by the Tables 1 and 4 also indicates how much
quantitative weight the NAIRU-mismatch approach puts on the empirical
matter of wage determination. If there are two different countries with
exactly the same 'structural characteristics' - say, for the two-sector
case u=0.5 and X=0.8 so that SP = MS- = 66.7 per cent and MSQ =
29.4 per cent -, but different types of sectoral wage functions - say,
country A having type (4) and country B type (30) - then the two
countries will be judged to have a very different share of structural
unemployment (2/3 for country B, less than 1/3 for country A). Again,
the inevitable model specifics of the mismatch philosophy lead to utterly
implausible results: hardly any serious economist would advise the
government of B to focus on 'structural policy' and the government- 26 -
Table 4: The Share of Structural Unemployment SP(=MS_) for Selected J *
Parameter Configurations of X and u (Equation 34)
JJI 0. 1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0 0 0 0 0
0.1 9.1 8.2 7.2 6.3
0.2
: 18.4 16.7 14.9 13.0
0.3 27. 8 25. 5 23. 1 20.5
0.4 37.5 34.8 31.8 28.6
0.5 47.4 44.4 41.2 37.5
0:6 57.4 54.5 51.2 47.4
6.7 67.7 65.1 62.0 58.3
0.8 ' 78.3 76.2 73.7 70.6
0.9 89.0 87.8 86.3 84.4
0.95 94.5 93.8 93.0 91.9 90.5 88.4 85.1 79.2 65.5
0.99 98.9 98.8 98.6 98.3 98.0 97.5 96.7 95.2 90.8




















































Figures for SP in per cent.- 27 -
of A to stick to aggregate measures only because B has a leading sector
in wage determination while A has not!
All this reveals a kind of schizophrenic attitude not untypical for
economists: on the level of theory, they apply sophisticated tools which
are consistent with their general analytical apparatus, but which may
have quite outrageous empirical implications. On the level of policy
practice, they forget about these tools and their unpleasant implications
and simply resort to an off-hand judgement. The crucial range in the
middle - meaning a theory which is empirically plausible and consistent
with a well-founded policy intuition - is often left untouched. Examples
for this professional schizophrenia abound: the poor record of allocation
theory which took ridiculously small Harberger-triangles as the relevant
measure of inefficiency caused by monopolistic price distortions and
which was justly ignored by policymakers who wanted to make a sound
case for a competitive market economy; or the failure of traditional (not
the new!) growth theory as an account of international differences in
growth performance which made policymakers turn away to more ad hoc
interpretations of economic development. In this sense, the attitude of
embedding the idea of structural unemployment in the framework of
macroeconomic orthodoxy and thus in effect depriving it of basically all
empirical relevance may be just another case in point. To be sure,
policymakers do not care - and rightly so!
Layard, Nickell, Jackman [1991], pp. 314-315, quote empirical evidence
for regions in Britain and the United States pointing to the absence of
a leading region. In contrast, econometric estimates of the author for
West Germany speak more for a wage function of type (30) than of
type (4). Again, drawing the conclusion from such evidence that
structural unemployment should - ceteris paribus - be considered much
larger in West Germany than in the two other countries appears to be
rather farfetched.- 28 -
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